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Stieglitz: The Inadequacy of Legal Remedy Requirement for Equitable Relief:

THE "INADEQUACY OF LEGAL
REMEDY" REQUIREMENT FOR
EQUITABLE RELIEF: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE AND ITS
APPLICATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Traditionally, courts of equity granted relief only if the petitioner's remedy at law was inadequate. The apparent simplicity of this practice is deceptive. While applying the rule of inadequacy of legal remedy seems an easy matter at first blush,
closer examination reveals a number of conceptual and practical
difficulties.
Commentators and historians agree only generally as to the
rule's origins and, as a result, no encompassing definition of "inadequacy" exists. Disagreement exists over what role the rule
plays, or ought to play, today, especially in light of the several
exceptions to the rule which have emerged. The rule first appears to be a clear test which can be mechanically applied. It is,
however, actually a subtle tool which arguably has evolved from
a quasi-jurisdictional device into something of a guide which
courts of equity can look to when making remedial determinations after assuming jurisdiction.
Part one of this Note will examine the historical origins of
the rule and then consider its role today. Part two will explore
how the rule is applied in South Carolina, and part three will
briefly discuss the practical implications of the rule for litigation
in this jurisdiction.
I.

ORIGINS AND FUNCTION OF THE RULE

A.

HistoricalBackground

The traditional rule has been expressed in a variety of ways
by a variety of commentators. Dobbs states that equitable relief
was traditionally denied unless the matter was one in which the
677
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plaintiff's remedy at law was inadequate.1 Chafee's interpretation of the traditional rule is that the court lacked power to
grant equitable relief unless, in addition to its having personal
and subject matter jurisdiction, the "plaintiff had a reason for
coming into equity." 2 According to Pomeroy, the traditional rule
is that "equity jurisdiction extends to and embraces all civil
cases . . . in which there is not a full, adequate, and complete
remedy at law."' 3 Walsh writes that "historically, there is no
doubt that equity intervened to protect legal rights only in cases
where the remedy at law was inadequate. ' 4 He concludes that
"lack or inadequacy of relief at law has, therefore, been the basis
upon which equity has always acted."
This small sample of views reveals a divergence of authority
on the issue of whether the inadequacy rule is jurisdictional, or
whether it is only a guide to determining the propriety of granting an equitable remedy. Furthermore, the differences among
the authorities reveal the difficulty in defining "inadequacy" for
purposes of the rule.' The historical development of the rule
must be explored in order to begin resolving these issues.
The origins of the rule are believed to lie in the slow division between law and equity which took place in England between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.7 Prior to the fourteenth century, no clear distinction existed between law and
equity. The common law courts heard legal and equitable matters side-by-side, under a common procedure, and fashioned
remedies with great flexibility in order to do justice in individual

1. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5 (1973).

2. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 304 (1950).
3. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 132 (5th ed. 1941).
4. R. WALSH, A TREATSE ON EQUITY § 25 (1930).
5. Id. at § 133.
6. Chafee appears to conceptualize the rule as a remedial guide. He views the rule as
a consideration that a court of equity, which already possesses personal and subject matter jurisdiction, should take into account in determining the propriety of granting a remedy. Likewise, Dobbs appears to follow Chafee, speaking of the rule in terms of the
granting of a remedy rather than in terms of the court's power to hear the case.
Conversely, Pomeroy and Walsh view the rule in terms of the court's power to act
rather than in terms of a remedial consideration, thereby seeing it as jurisdictional. Pomeroy asserts that the jurisdiction of equity extends to those civil cases where the legal
remedy is inadequate. Walsh argues that the rule is the basis on which equity courts act.
Since subject matter and personal jurisdiction is the basis upon which all courts act, it is
safe to conclude that Walsh, like Pomeroy, views the rule as jurisdictional.
7. See WALSH, supra note 4, at 281, 287.
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cases. This period, from 1200 to approximately 1350, has been
described as the first stage in the development of English equity.
Holdsworth contends that the "universal principle" of the fair
administration of law was applied during this time within the
framework of the existing common law courts. According to
Holdsworth, the second stage in the development of English equity commenced after 1350 and was characterized by the application of this "universal principle" outside the common law,
mainly by the ecclesiastical Chancellors.'
Other legal scholars have described the gradual divorce of
law and equity somewhat differently. A common theme, however, is the hardening of the common law writ system into a
rigid, unresponsive ritual, necessitating pleas to the higher authority of the crown in order to secure justice.9 The early common law courts did, indeed, enjoy broad remedial powers during
the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. For example, common law courts in the early 1300's frequently acted in personam,
issuing what amounted to injunctions, in the form of writs of
prohibition. The recipient of the writ was commanded to desist
from certain activities or to perform certain acts, as the case required. 10 As long as a writ existed recognizing the plaintiff's
cause, the early English common law courts made no distinction
between legal and equitable actions, and they issued remedies
sufficient to vindicate the rights protected by the writs. Thus, as
long as neither a procedural nor conceptual distinction existed
between legal and equitable relief, there was no need for a rule
governing access to one particular type of remedy or to a separate and distinct court. 1 It was only when equity separated from
law that access to equity began to turn upon the application of
certain articulated maxims such as the "inadequacy of legal rem-

8.Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REv. 293 (1914).
9. Id. at 294-95; R. WALSH, supra note 4, at 12.
10. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 678 (5th ed. 1956). Another species of writ, called the quia timet, was aimed at preventing a wrong before it
occurred, much like a modem restraining order. Id. at 679. A third writ, the writ of breve
magistralia,issued to meet new legal problems and grant flexible remedies. Id.
11. This flexible nature of the common law courts during the first half of the fourteenth century led Professor Adams to comment that "So long as common law remained
a flexible system, its field undefined, its power of inclusion unlimited, its organs undifferentiated, there was no reason for distinguishing between it and equity, and all that was
later done by equity could still be done in the field of the common law." Adams, The
Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. Rv.87, 97 (1916).
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edy" rule. As has been noted, most scholars date the beginning
of this divorce between law and equity from the mid-1300's, and
attribute it to the growing inflexibility of the common law writ
system.
The common law writs, which were necessary to initiate an
action, were issued by the Chancellor, a member of the King's
royal council. Clerks and scribes in the Chancellor's office produced and copied writs, and new writs issued only upon the
Chancellor's approval. 2 Under this arrangement, the limits of
the common law reached as far as the willingness and power of
the Chancellor to sanction new writs, allowing recognition of
new causes of action and new theories of relief. The maintenance
of this system, and its continuing ability to deliver justice to litigants, depended upon a flexible attitude toward new writs.
This liberal attitude was shortlived, however, for as early as
1258, Parliament, in the Provisions of Oxford, forbade the Chancellor from framing new writs without the consent of the King
and his entire council. 13 In Walsh's view, this enactment effectively extinguished the Chancellor's ability to respond to new legal problems at common law, by locking the common law remedies into the framework of the writs existing in 1258. This
statute was followed by another, in 1300, which prohibited the
Exchequer from hearing common pleas.14
Commentators interpret these actions as a reaction by common law courts to the threat posed by a jurisprudence based on
the notion of royal justice and fair-dealing rather than on precedent, technique, tradition, or formalities. The King had long entertained petitions from his subjects seeking justice and, acting
through the Chancellor, he had power to command that justice
be done. In something of a circular chain, the gradual ossification of common law substance and procedure led more litigants
to petition the King for royal justice, which, when granted, further antagonized the common law judges who then, according to
Plucknett, retreated further into "the stricter school of legal

12. T. PLUCKNET, supra note 10, at 164.
13. R. WALSH, supra note 4, at 8.
14. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 10, at 160. As a member of the royal council, and
incident to his responsibility for state finances, the Exchequer had long heard cases in-

volving trade and commerce and had granted broad forms of relief. See id. at 160-61.
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thought. ' 15 This "strict school" was characterized by fealty to

form over substance and procedure over outcome. Thus, "the
lawyers had a maxim that they would tolerate a 'mischief' (a
failure of substantial justice in a particular case) rather than an
'inconvenience' (a breach of legal principle)." 16
The common law courts developed ever stricter rules of
pleading, proof, and evidence, and began to adopt money damages as their main remedial tool. Various historians have summarized this process, which Walsh calls the "decay of equity in
the common law."1' They conclude that the legislative restrictions on the Chancellor's power to fashion new common law
writs converted the common law into a much less flexible system, allowing little if any discretion, and providing well-defined
restrictions on what could and could not be accomplished. 8
With this increasing rigidity in the common law courts, the
stage was set for the schism between these increasingly competitive systems of justice, one animated by strict dedication to
traditional forms of action, and the other by what has often been
called a jurisprudence of conscience.19 Growing numbers of litigants believed themselves unable to obtain either substantive or
procedural justice in the common law courts, and scholars have
traced a rise in the number of petitions directed to the King's
Council (or Chancellor) throughout the latter 1300's and

15. Id. at 680.
16. Id.
17. R. WALSH, supra note 4, at 8.
18. As to this stiffening of the common law, Adams notes that, "The common law
was becoming a hard and fast system with certain clearly defined things which it could
do and with equally defined things which it could not do." Adams, supra note 11, at 96.
See also Barbour, who observes that,
The manner in which equity ... disappeared from the common law has become common knowledge. The jealousy of Parliament[,] [arising from the] ...
realization that the power to make new writs was a power to make new law,
forced the writs into a closed cycle, and put an end to the free development of
the common law.
Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth Century Chancery, 31 HAnv. L. REv. 834 (1918).
Further commenting on this acquired rigidity of the common law, Holdsworth asserts
that, "In the latter half of the fourteenth century, and in the fifteenth century, the common law tended to become a fixed and rigid system." Holdsworth, supra note 8, at 294.
Finally, Plucknett maintains that, "[The common law courts lost much of their discretion and explicitly abandoned any thought of tempering law with equity .....
Plucknett, supra note 10, at 681.
19. See generally Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. Rav. 373, 379 (1908); Barbour, supra note 18, at 838.
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1400's.20 This is not surprising, as the King had historically

served as something of a court of last resort, and petitions for
justice had long come his way. Adams has put it succinctly, stating that the ancestor of the bill in equity was the petition to the
Council.21
These petitions were popular because royal justice could operate with great flexibility and could secure rights which the
common law had become unable, or unwilling, to protect. In
matters of contract, for example, the law courts would not uphold oral agreements, consider partial performance, or order specific performance, while the Chancellor, acting for the King,
could do all these things.22 As another example, Barbour cites a
case in which the plaintiff charged the defendant with common
law trespass for withdrawing water from his pond by sorcery,
thereby harming his animals pastured in an adjoining meadow.
The common law court refused to recognize the action and dismissed it. The plaintiff then petitioned the Chancellor to restrain the defendant from "using the crafts of enchantment,
witchcraft, and sorcery," saying that "the common law may not
help. 23s The Chancellor issued the restraint.
By granting such remedies, the Chancellor was filling a need
which the common law courts, bound to their traditional writs,
procedures, forms of proof, and remedies, could not satisfy. By
the end of the fourteenth century, petitions were flowing to the
King and were routed to the Chancellor for resolution. The dictates of his conscience supplied the content of early independent
equitable jurisdiction and, because most of the early Chancellors
were ecclesiastics, this content was distinctly directed toward
justice and fair-dealing.24
By the 1500's, this conceptual distinction between law and
equity had been established. The former dealt with specific,

20. Barbour, supra note 18, at 840.
21. Adams, supra note 11, at 98.
22. Barbour, supra note 18, at 848.
23. Id. at 853.
24. Vinogradoff, supra note 19, at 379; T. PLUCKNrr, supra note 10, at 695-96. Barhour notes that many of the early petitions to the Chancellor requested him to exercise
his jurisdiction in matters of conscience. See generally Barbour, supra note 18, at 853.
See also Holdsworth, supra note 8, at 295. Arguably then, it seems that from its earliest
days equity was to be concerned with moral and ethical right. See generally Vinogradoff,
supra note 19, at 378-79.
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fixed forms of action and awarded money damages, while the
latter addressed injustice and hardship, and fashioned remedies
to meet the moral demands of good conscience.2 5 Over time, the
Chancellor developed a set of courts, a staff, and the administrative routine of a separate judicial system. James I formally recognized the Courts of Chancery as co-equal with the common
law courts, and the long philosophical division between the two
thus crystallized into institutional form. 28 Thereafter, a dual,

competing system of courts existed, one protecting traditional
legal rights through the remedy of damages, the other protecting
matters of conscience by acting personally upon individual
litigants. 27
B.

"Inadequacy" and Early Equity Jurisdiction

From this brief historical discussion, it is apparent that
even before law and equity divorced institutionally, some general notion existed that the Chancellor should act upon petitions
when the petitioner had failed to obtain, or could not obtain,
justice in the law courts. Arguably, this notion provides the conceptual foundation for the formal rule of inadequacy of legal
remedy as a prerequisite to equitable relief.28
Barbour identifies two classes of cases which regularly received the Chancellor's attention. The first consisted of cases in
which some inequality between the parties made it impossible to
achieve justice in the common law courts;29 the second class was
comprised of cases in which the impartiality of the local law
court was suspect. This early practice is summarized by Barbour, stating that the Chancellor would intervene if "the legal
remedy was but of theoretical value."30 Apparently, it was soon
established that litigants did not have an absolute right in the
25. Vinogadoff, supra note 19, at 378; Barbour, supra note 18, at 849.
26. Holdsworth, supra note 8, at 295, 297; T. PLucn N-r, supra note 10, at 681.
27. 15 HOLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104-138 (1965). By the Judicature
Acts of 1873 and 1875, Chancery and the common law courts were combined and the
forms of action were abolished, fusing law and equity. Id.
28. Barbour seems to share this view: "Certainly the petitions (to the Chancellor)
bear witness to the belief among all classes that in the Chancellor resided a general
power to redress all wrongs if for any reason the person injured could not protect himself
through the common law." Barbour, supra note 18, at 857.
29. Id. at 856. This inequality was usually economic in nature.
30. Id. at 858.
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first instance to what is today called equity. Rather, equity
would operate only to redress real, concrete, demonstrable deficiencies in the justice available in the common law courts. After
chancery separated institutionally from the law courts and developed a more formal jurisprudence, equity came to take original jurisdiction of certain types of cases and developed purely
equitable causes of action.3 1 In turn, this development led to
more definite rules describing when cases were appropriate for
Chancery and when they were not. However, when we see the
pre-schism Chancellors granting petitions for royal grace, we see
the "inadequacy of legal remedy" rule in its embryonic stage,
"inadequacy" being apparently synonomous with "injustice."
Broad as it may seem, the notion of injustice, or "conscience,"
served as a principle of selection in these early times. The Chancellor could not accept every petition that came his way, and in
the very idea that the Chancellor should attend to those cases
where justice had somehow gone awry lay the seeds of a rule
which, with time, became akin to a maxim of jurisdiction.
The commentators generally agree that the "inadequacy of
legal remedy" rule did serve a jurisdictional function in the early
days after equity and law courts separated. The rule appears to
have operated as an early device to help define the reach and
power of the equity courts or, as Dobbs phrases it, to protect the
separation of jurisdiction between courts of law and equity.3 2
Whether the rule was literally jurisdictional in the modern sense
is not clear. If it was, then a court of equity had no power to
decide a matter if the petitioner had available an adequate legal
remedy. Presumably, any decree issued in the face of this adequate legal remedy would be void. Cox asserts that "if the cause
of action was not of a kind that fell within the province of the
Chancellor, a court of equity had no power to decide the
cause.) 33 The "inadequacy" rule was, then, one device to help
determine whether a particular cause was "of a kind" that the
Chancellor could act upon. If a legal remedy would adequately
redress the wrong complained of, then the case was outside the
Chancellor's jurisdiction.
Others suggest, however, that even if the rule did serve a

31. POMEROY, supra note 3, at §§ 133, 136-38.
32. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 61.
33. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 86, 93 (1948).
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strictly jurisdictional purpose at one time, it shortly developed

into a principle of selection and a guide to action. Thus, the defendant in equity could not disobey an order on the ground that
the plaintiff had an adequate legal remedy. He could, however,
argue that the equity court should refrain from exercising its
power because the plaintiff had available an adequate legal remedy, and he could appeal, arguing the availability of the legal
remedy made the case improper for equitable intervention.
Pomeroy expresses this view of the rule's early development. He notes that writers often incorrectly assume that equity
jurisdiction is measured by the absence or existence of remedies
at law, that equity reaches wherever law does not. The correct
view, according to Pomeroy, is that equity actually creates certain unique rights which it will protect through its own exclusive
jurisdiction, 34 independent of the adequacy or inadequacy of
available legal remedies. Its jurisdiction in these matters derives
from the existence of fundamental equitable interests, not from
the inadequacies of the common law.
On this basis, Pomeroy concludes that while the availability
of a legal remedy has nothing to do with defining the jurisdiction
of equity, it is relevant in determining whether a court of equity
ought to exercise its powers in a given situation. In this sense,
the rule requires the court to consider whether the claimant can
secure justice without resort to the special devices of equity, and
whether the interest under attack is one that warrants protection by equitable remedies.
In summary, Pomeroy maintains that equity has inherent
and exclusive jurisdiction over certain wholly equitable rights
and interests. 35 Presumably, these are matters in which the
claim is based squarely on conscience and right rather than upon
the fixed requirements of a cause at law. As a result, equity can
act in this sphere without regard to the legal remedies available
to the plaintiff.
However, where the claimant seeks to protect an interest
not exclusively equitable through the special devices of equity,
an equity court has jurisdiction, but must assess the adequacy of
the legal remedy before acting. The rule, in these instances,
serves as a guidepost to decision, and not as a maxim of
34. POMEROY, supra note 3, at § 131.
35. Id. at §§ 137-38.
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35

jurisdiction.
C.

The Rule's Purpose Today

Today, the general view of the rule is consistent with Pomeroy's analysis. Professor Rendleman argues that the rule may,
through improper application, fail to focus the Chancellor's attention on the proper issues. On the other hand, he contends
that the rule, if correctly applied as a remedial guidepost, would
focus the decision-maker's resources on several important issues.3" These issues include the acceptability of substituting
money damages for the invaded interest, the moral significance
of the invaded interest, and the court's own administrative capacities.3 7 The moral component forces the court to define those
interests which are too basic to permit the violator to, in effect,
buy injustice by paying damages. 38 Rendleman argues that the
rule is dead as a strictly jurisdictional doctrine. Its remaining
value, however, is its potential ability to force the court to weigh
and discern the fundamental interest at stake in an action, and
to make essentially moral choices about what rights are important enough to merit equity's extraordinary protection. The rule
becomes, in this scheme, a remedial consideration.
Dobbs embraces a similar conception of the rule's modern
function. He states that the "inadequacy of legal remedy" test
should be applied when the plaintiff's substantive claim is at law
(such as trespass, slander, assault), but the plaintiff seeks equitable relief because of the extraordinary remedies available.39 In
such a case, the adequacy rule should be used as a limitation on
the granting of equitable relief.40 Dobbs criticizes the notion that
the rule is strictly jurisdictional, noting that the logical end of
such a view is to declare invalid all equitable orders where an
adequate legal remedy is available. He sees the rule, again, as a
device to focus attention on certain basic policy considerations,
particularly whether the need for an equitable remedy outweighs
36. Rendleman, The InadequateRemedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33
U. FLA. L. REv. 346, 347 (1981).

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 348-52.
Id. at 352.
D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 60.
Id.
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the defendant's right to a jury trial. 41 Dobbs believes that with
the merger of law and equity, the rule became simply a rule of
decision or a tool for raising the policy issues which a court
should consider before granting equitable relief.
In light of these views, it is not unreasonable to ask whether
the rule has any real meaning today. Reflection reveals that equity courts must employ some principle of selection in the exercise of their powers. Otherwise, equity courts would do nothing
but supervise a myriad of in personam orders. The views expressed by Chafee, Dobbs, and Rendleman appear to envision
use of the "inadequacy" rule as just this principle of selection.
The rule does not determine jurisdiction, in the sense that an
equity court is prohibited from acting if an adequate legal remedy is available. Rather, it helps the court decide whether, in the
case in dispute, it should act with its extraordinary powers.
One question yet to be examined in this overview is what,
traditionally, has constituted "inadequacy"? A review of the
scholarship in this area reveals several different approaches
which appear to reach the same conclusion.
According to Rendleman, the legal remedy was inadequate
if it was less efficient than the equitable remedy, less speedy, or
less practical, or if the plaintiff's injury could not be measured
monetarily.42 Thus, the plaintiff had several avenues of argument for equitable relief; words such as "efficient" and "speedy"
necessitate considerable subjective interpretation.
Dobbs offers a more narrow definition. He states that the
cases in which the legal remedy was seen as inadequate fell into
four general patterns. The first was when the plaintiff had been
deprived of something to which he was entitled and which
money would not replace. In these situations, only specific restitution or a mandatory injunction could make the plaintiff whole.
Second was the case in which the plaintiff would have to bring
more than one action to protect his legal interest. A continuing
trespass, for example, would require the plaintiff to bring numerous suits at law if he could pursue only legal remedies. Equi-

41. In South Carolina, a court of equity may, within its discretion, empanel a jury to
assist in making factual determinations although the trial court is not bound by the
jury's verdict in deciding the case. Johnston v. Mathews, 183 S.C. 360, 191 S.E. 223
(1937); Erskine v. Erskine, 107 S.C. 233, 92 S.E. 465 (1917).

42. Rendleman, supra note 36, at 346.
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table relief, in the form of an injunction, could resolve the problem with more economy and efficiency. The third type of case
involved a plaintiff who had a claim for money damages against
an insolvent defendant. There, a legal judgment was worthless
and only specific performance by the defendant could provide an
effective remedy. Fourth was the case in which the plaintiff had
been injured, but in which damages could not be accurately
of a problem of
measured. Rather than denying recovery because
43
proof, equity intervened to fashion a remedy.
These classifications simply seem to be different ways of restating Barbour's argument that a legal remedy was inadequate
if it was of only theoretical value. If real, concrete relief could
not be had, or if the law court was so infected with fraud or
prejudice that justice was unattainable, then equitable relief was
proper.
D. Summary of the General Rule
From the foregoing, one may conclude that with the merger
of law and equity, the rule lost its value as a device to protect
the jurisdiction of two independent court systems. It remained
valuable, however, as a means of focusing the equity court's attention on the question of whether it ought to act in a given
situation, forcing the equity court to consider exactly what
rights and social interests merited preservation through the extraordinary remedies of equity. Thus, the rule enables modern
courts to rank interests, deciding which should be upheld by legal and equitable devices.
Under this modern view, "adequate" simply means "appropriate" in terms of the value society accords the violated interest. A heinous invasion of a highly regarded interest may require
a coercive equitable remedy even if money can compensate the
plaintiff, while an invasion of a less crucial interest may be appropriately remedied by damages, even if the facts suggest equitable relief. The concept of "adequacy" should, today, be used to
balance the social significance of the right invaded with the type
of remedy applied. This, it seems, is the most valuable purpose
the traditional rule can serve after the merger of law and equity

43. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 57.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss4/8

12

1984]

Stieglitz: TheINADEQUACY
Inadequacy of OF
Legal
Remedy
Requirement for Equitable Relief:
REMEDY
LEGAL

has obviated the need for strictly safeguarding the jurisdiction of
two separate court systems.
Heretofore, the rule has been explored in terms of its history and in terms of its role in modern litigation. Part two of
this Note will consider its development and application in the
jurisprudence of South Carolina.
II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA PRACTICE
A.

Jurisdictionalor Decisional?

South Carolina incorporated the traditional "inadequacy of
legal remedy" requirement into its jurisprudence at an early
date. A 1791 statute provided that "suits in equity shall not be
sustained in any case where plain and adequate remedy can be
had at the common law."'

4

In Rees v. Parish,45 the court inter-

preted this statute as jurisdictional, defining the reach of the
power of the Chancery court to act. In Rees, the petitioners alleged that they were the rightful legatees of certain Negroes in
the defendant's possession. They sought a decree ordering the
return of their property, and payment for the value of the work
the Negroes had performed for the defendant. The defendant
demurred, asserting that Chancery lacked jurisdiction over the
case because the plaintiffs had an action at law for trover and
detinue, and the Chancellor dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. Citing the 1791 statute, the appeals court in equity
affirmed, holding that a court of equity could not take jurisdiction of a case where an adequate remedy at law existed.46 This
jurisdictional interpretation of the 1791 statute is interesting in
that the defendant made a minimal showing of an adequate legal
remedy available to the petitioner. The modern trend places
upon the petitioner the burden of showing the inadequacy of his
legal remedy. 7
Despite this jurisdictional interpretation of the statute in
Rees, two other cases suggest that the rule was not strictly a ju44. 1840 S.C. Acts 278.
45. 6 S.C. Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 56 (1825).
46. Id. at 59. The court expressed this holding in the following language: "It has
long been the rule of the Court of Equity, that they would not entertain jurisdiction of a
case where there was a plain and adequate remedy at law." Id.
47. See Knohl v. Duke Power Co., 260 S.C. 374, 376, 196 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1973).
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risdictional device in pre-merger South Carolina. In Harman v.
Counts, 48 the petitioner was the endorsee of a non-negotiable
note. By statute, any person, other than the original payee, who
sued on a non-negotiable note was required to bring the action
at law. Harman, however, had secured an equity decree to recover damages for Counts' failure to honor the note. The defendant appealed, and the decree was set aside.
In reversing this decree, the court used ambiguous language.
The court seemed to reason that in order to act, a court of equity could not disregard existing legal, statutory remedies, and
that because in this case the petitioner had such an adequate
statutory remedy, the court had no jurisdiction to grant an equitable remedy.49 In dicta, however, the court stated that:
As to what has been urged on the ground of equity, it is sufficient to say, that, taking it for granted that the district court in
the exercise of its summary jurisdiction, on petition and process, may decide according to the rules which prevail in courts
of equity, yet it will not follow that this decree ought to stand
....Equity ought to follow the law and not proceed in contradiction to the law.50
The use of the word "ought" indicates that while the availability of an adequate remedy at law may not divest a court of
equity of jurisdiction, it may serve as a governor of the equity
court's discretion, telling the court when it should and should
not act. If this is true, then the dicta of the court in Harman is
in striking conformity with the views of Chafee, who contends
that "equity jurisdiction refers simply to a bundle of sound prin' Under
ciples of decision concerning particular kinds of relief."51
this approach, the appellate court may use the rule to find reversible error by the lower court, but not to void its jurisdiction
by finding that the court never had the power to act. While
Chafee directed this idea to the period after the merger of law
and equity, it was foreshadowed by the dicta in Harman fiftynine years before merger occured in South Carolina.
In Farley v. Farley5 2 it was further suggested that the South
48. 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 476 (1811).

49. Id. at 477.
50. Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
51. Z. CHAPEE, supra note 2, at 304.

52. 6 S.C. Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 506 (1826).
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Carolina courts did not view the rule as purely jurisdictional.
There, the petitioner brought a bill in equity for the return of
certain Negroes held by the defendant. The defendant objected
to the jurisdiction of the equity court, asserting that a legal action for trover and detinue was available. The Chancellor, however, issued a decree for the petitioner and on appeal the petitioner portrayed his action as one for specific performance.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. A close analysis
of its reasoning, however, reveals that it did so not because the
availability of a legal remedy stripped the lower court of jurisdiction, but because the petitioner had not shown that he had a
proper case for exercise of equity's extraordinary powers.
The court began by assessing whether trover and detinue
were adequate legal remedies. It noted that although neither action would secure recovery of the specific property sought, an
equitable decree would similarly fail to secure a specific recovery
unless the petitioner, through the further legal action of bail,
prevented the defendant from transferring the property out of
the jurisdiction. Because supplemental legal action would be
necessary to insure the petitioner's specific recovery regardless
of whether he won a suit for trover or obtained an equitable decree, the legal remedy was adequate, and was the remedy to
which the petitioner should have resorted.
The court did not rest there, however. It went on to state in
dicta that even where an adequate remedy exists at law, equity
will act if the legal remedy is "difficult." In the context of a dispute over wrongful holding of goods, the legal remedy, trover, is
difficult (sufficient to trigger equitable relief) when the personalty is so unique that money damages could not adequately compensate for its loss. 53 Concluding that there was nothing unique
about the Negroes involved here, the court decided that money
damages could adequately compensate the petitioner for their
loss.

53. Id. at 517. In two later cases, however, the equity court issued decrees ordering
the specific return of slaves without regard to their uniqueness. Sims v. Shelton, 21 S.C.
Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 221 (1848); Young v. Burton, 16 S.C. Eq. (Mg. Mull Eq.) 225 (1841).
The court in Sims said it would presume the slaves were of such peculiar value as to
entitle the petitioner to equitable relief, unless there was sufficient rebuttal by the defendant. 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) at 224. In Hall v. Joiner, 1 S.C. 186, 190-91 (1869), the
court restated the rule that the specific return of chattel in equity was available when
the value of the chattel could not be ascertained.
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Farley suggests that South Carolina had abandoned, at an
early point, a talismanic approach to the rule. The decision
shows the court declaring the breadth of its equity powers-it
can act even if an adequate legal remedy exists-but also developing guidelines as to when it ought to act. When specific return
of goods is sought, the court ought to act only if the items involved are so unique or special that they cannot be restored by
money damages. By the time Farley was decided, the courts of
South Carolina were apparently moving away from a literal, jurisdictional interpretation of the rule to an approach which applied the rule as a guide to decision, forcing the courts to think
carefully about when equitable relief should issue.
B.

The Rule in Post-Merger Practice

In 1870, the South Carolina General Assembly abolished the
traditional forms of action and the dual court system. Henceforth, all actions for the enforcement of private rights and redress of private wrongs would be denominated civil actions and
would be heard in the same forum. " Since 1870, with some minor deviation, the traditional rule has been used solely as a
guide to decision in South Carolina.
This newer view of the "inadequacy" requirement was applied as recently as 1978 in Van Robinson Insurance Agency v.
Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.55 The defendant notified the
petitioner of its intention to terminate an agreement under
which the petitioner had served as the defendant's South Carolina agent. The petitioner sought an injunction prohibiting cancellation of the agreement, even though a state statute provided
the agent with a cause of action for damages for wrongful cancel54. 1870 S.C. Acts 443; Johnson v. Aetna Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1970);
Emory v. Hazard Powder Co., 22 S.C. 476 (1885); Chapman v. Lipscomb, 18 S.C. 222
(1882). This approach to the rule was demonstrated in Monteith v. Harby, 190 S.C. 453,
3 S.E.2d 250 (1939). There, the petitioners sought to recover for the conversion and misuse of trust funds, styling their action as one for an accounting in an attempt to secure
equitable relief. The court concluded that a legal judgment for the petitioners, based on
a tort action, would "fully satisfy their demands." Id. at 456, 3 S.E.2d at 251. The court
affirmed the trial court's transfer of the suit from equity to the law calendar. In so doing,
the court did not apply the rule to determine which side of the court of common pleas
had jurisdiction. Rather, the focus was on whether the legal relief could adequately protect the petitioner's interest. If so, no reason existed for equity to act.
55. 272 S.C. 127, 249 S.E.2d 744 (1978).
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lation of the agency agreement.5 6 The trial court refused to issue
the injunction, and the petitioner appealed.
Affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
statutory action "afford[ed] [petitioner] the full relief to which
it [was] entitled. Since [petitioner] possess[ed] an adequate remedy at law, equity [would] not intervene." 57 The question was
not whether the equity court had jurisdiction, but whether it
ought to have acted. The availability of a legal remedy, while not
determinative, did help guide the court on this latter issue. Determining whether an adequate remedy at law exists results in
correct decisions about when equitable relief should be provided.
In light of Van Robinson, it appears the better argument is
that the traditional rule has nothing to do with allocating or determining jurisdiction in post-merger South Carolina. This position is not completely unassailable, however. In American
Surety Co. v. Muckenfuss, 58 the court granted a demurrer on
jurisdictional grounds after determining that the petitioner had
an adequate remedy at law. There, the petitioner sought an equitable decree releasing it from its bond on the administrator of
an estate, who had died, and for an accounting of claims against
the administrator's estate. The defendant demurred, and the
trial judge overruled the demurrer. Reversing, the court framed
the issue as whether the court of common pleas, sitting in equity, had jurisdiction. Determining that a state statute provided
the relief desired by the surety, the court held that such equity
jurisdiction did not exist, 5 and ordered the demurrer granted.
Arguably, American Surety permits a defendant to object,
by demurrer, to jurisdiction whenever a statutory legal remedy
is available to the petitioner and that fact appears on the face of
the complaint. 60 Further, the holding suggests that the demurrer
must be granted because the court lacks power to hear the case
if the petitioner has an adequate legal remedy.
However, American Surety may have little vitality today.

56.
57.
58.
59.

S.C.

CODE ANN. §§ 38-37-10 to -1520 (1976).
272 S.C. at 128-29, 249 S.E.2d at 745.
172 S.C. 169, 173 S.E. 290 (1934).
Id. at 173, 173 S.E. at 292. The court expressed its holding in the following lan-

guage: "As for the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas in equity, recourse to the
court of equity can hardly be demanded when there is an adequate legal remedy supplied by statute." Id.
60. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-320(1)(1976).
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The case involved a plea for equitable relief when statutory relief was also available. The issues were identical to those
presented by Van Robinson, in which the existence of the statutory remedy was viewed as merely a factor in deciding whether
equity ought to intervene. It may be reasonably argued, therefore, that Van Robinson implicitly overrules American Surety,
at least insofar as Van Robinson did not attach jurisdictional
significance to the fact that statutory relief was available to the
petitioner in equity.
In summary, it appears that South Carolina courts, both
before and after the merger of law and equity, have at times
applied the "inadequacy of legal remedy" rule as a guide to
proper remedial decisions, rather than invoking it mechanically
to allocate jurisdiction. Cases to the contrary are distinctly at
odds with the broad trend and are of questionable continuing
validity.
C. Pomeroy's Analytic Scheme
Pomeroy suggests that equity may take cognizance of two
basic types of cases. 1 First, certain actions are inherently equitable, having been developed and refined traditionally by the equity courts. Equitable relief may be provided in these cases regardless of the existence of a legal remedy. The second category
consists of those cases seeking to enforce an essentially legal
right, but by equitable means. Here, the propriety of equitable
intervention may be determined by applying the traditional rule,
that is, by asking whether an adequate legal remedy is otherwise
available to the petitioner.
Pomeroy's scheme is helpful in examining the use of the
traditional rule in modern South Carolina jurisprudence. It facilitates classification of the South Carolina cases, and leads to certain conclusions about when the court views the rule as significant today.
In South Carolina, equity has exclusive jurisdiction over the
administration or enforcement of trusts.62 Equity may also order
specific performance of land conveyances, without regard to
61. POMEROY, supra note 3, at §§ 131-33.

62. Weston v. Weston, 210 S.C. 1, 41 S.E.2d 372 (1947); Ex ParteRowley, 260 S.C.
174, 20 S.E.2d 383 (1942).
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other legal remedies.0 3 Also, an action to foreclose on a mechanic's lien is exclusively equitable," as is an action for the reformation of instruments.6 5 As a result, all of these equitable remedies
are available without reference to legal relief.
A wide variety of other equitable remedies, however, are
subject to the traditional rule regarding the inadequacy of legal
relief. A brief review of the major areas to which the rule applies
follows.
1.

Accounting

South Carolina has long recognized an equitable action for
an accounting.66 The equity side of the court should not grant an
accounting, however, unless no adequate remedy at law exists.6
Where the accounts are simple, it may be possible for a jury to
comprehend the figures and incorporate them into a damages
award. Therefore, it has been held that accounts must be detailed and complex in order to render the legal remedy inadequate. 8 The theory contemplates that the jury's inability to understand complicated accounts constitutes "inadequacy" of legal
remedy.
2. Specific Performance of a Contract
The courts in South Carolina will not order specific performance if an action at law for breach of contract will adequately compensate the petitioner.6 9 It is uncertain whether difficulty in proving damages amounts to an "inadequacy"
sufficient to entitle the petitioner to specific performance. In
Van Robinson, the petitioner argued that he was entitled to eq-

63. Belin v. Stikeleather, 232 S.C. 116, 101 S.E.2d 185 (1957); Adams v. Willis, 225
S.C. 518, 83 S.E.2d 171 (1954).
64. Winston & Co. v. Ga. & Fla. R.R., 34 F.2d 163 (W.D.S.C. 1929).
65. Chisolm v. Pryor, 207 S.C. 54, 35 S.E.2d 21 (1945).
66. Byrd v. King, 245 S.C. 247, 140 S.E.2d 158 (1965); Taylor v. Thompson, 213 S.C.
104, 48 S.E.2d 648 (1948); Butler v. Ardis, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) 60 (1827).
67. Jeffries v. Harvey, 206 S.C. 245, 33 S.E.2d 513 (1945); Butler v. Ardis, 7 S.C. Eq.
(2 McCord Eq.) 60 (1827).
68. Jeffries v. Harvey, 206 S.C. 245, 250, 33 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1945).
69. See Kirk v. Clark, 191 S.C. 205, 4 S.E.2d 13 (1939); Bowden v. Schatzell, 8 S.C.
Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 360 (1831). This rule is inapplicable to land sale contracts. See supra note
62 and accompanying text.
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uitable relief, even though a statutory remedy was available, because he would have difficulty proving his consequential damages. The court stated that such an obstacle was "not [a]
sufficient basis to transform an action at law into one in equity.

70°

Although the petitioner was seeking an injunction rather

than specific performance, there is no reason to believe that the
court would adopt a different rule in cases seeking specific
performance.
Directly opposed to the dicta in Van Robinson, however, is
the 1939 case of Kirk v. Clark,71 in which the court stated that
uncertainty in fixing the measure of damages may justify the exercise of equitable relief. Unless Van Robinson implicitly overruled Kirk, it appears at least arguable that in South Carolina a
material problem in calculating damages can render inadequate
72
an otherwise available legal remedy.
3. Injunctions
The traditional rule arises with great frequency in cases involving injunctions. The case of Carter v. Lake City Baseball
Club" illustrates nicely how the rule is used in an action in
I
which injunctive relief is sought.
In Carter,the defendant, an incorporated professional baseball team, played its games on a field in a residential section of
Lake City, South Carolina. The petitioners, who resided near the
field, complained of baseballs striking their houses, cars parking
on their lawns, lights shining in their windows, and noise keeping them awake. They petitioned to enjoin the team from using
the field, and the trial court held for the defendant. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed and ordered the injunction to issue.
The court reasoned that a nuisance did exist and that property damage had occurred, but that if a law court could provide
complete redress for this damage, equity should not intervene.
Property damage is compensable by an action at law for trespass. This did not end the inquiry, however, for equity may act

70. 272 S.C. at 129, 249 S.E.2d at 745.
71. 191 S.C. 205, 211, 4 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1939).
72. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Custom Recording Co., 258 S.C.
465, 477, 189 S.E.2d 305, 311 (1972).
73. 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950).
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despite the legal remedy if inaction would produce "irreparable
mischief," immeasurable damages, or a "constantly recurring
grievance."7'4 The court held that the injuction should issue because the trespass was ongoing and constant, and because the
petitioners would have to bring repeated suits at law if they
were denied equitable relief.
The holding in Carter indicates that a legal remedy is inadequate if it forces the plaintiff to bring a multiplicity of lawsuits.
The court's perfunctory statement that inability to measure
damages will justify equitable intervention strengthens the supposition that the court would, if presented squarely with the issue, find a legal remedy inadequate because of difficulties in determining damages. Another factor, mentioned briefly in the
opinion, was the insolvency of the defendant baseball corporation, which rendered it unable to respond to a judgment at law.
Arguably, the defendant's inability to pay damages may also
constitute an "inadequacy" of legal remedy, entitling the petitioner to equitable relief.7"
Applying Pomeroy's scheme, it is possible to draw general
conclusions about when the traditional rule will be invoked in
South Carolina. With regard to the enforcement of trusts and
land conveyances, the foreclosure of mechanic's liens, and the
reformation of instruments, equity may act regardless of the
availability of legal remedies, because the rule simply does not
apply to these actions. With regard to actions for an accounting,
specific performance or an injunction, however, the rule must be
applied by the court to determine whether it ought to act.7 6

74. Id. at 271, 62 S.E.2d at 477.

75. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 62. Note how closely these conceptions of "inadequacy" resemble each other.

76. It should be noted that the rule has also been applied to several other types of
actions, but its use arises most frequently where the petitioner seeks an accounting, spe-

cific performance, or an injunction. Other types of actions inclldeactions for rescission
for mistake, see Turner v. Washington Realty Co., 178 S.C. 2?4T,-1; 122 S.E. 768, 769
(1924), for the return of a specific chattel, see Hall v. Joiner, I S.{a. 186, 190-91 (1869),
for measurement of dower in lands, see Lane v. Lane, 211 S.C. 536, 542, 34 S.E.2d 754,
756 (1945), for determination of the priority of liens, see Dana v. Peurifoy, 142 S.C. 46,
47, 140 S.E. 247, 248 (1927) (case decided prior to South Carolina's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code), for relief from a penalty, see Lane v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
147 S.C. 333, 373, 145 S.E. 196, 209 (1928), and for the creation of an equitable lien, see
Georgia-Carolina Gravel Co. v. Blassingame, 129 S.C. 18, 25, 123 S.E. 324, 326 (1924).
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What Is an "Inadequate" Legal Remedy?

The cases and commentaries are replete with general statements about what constitutes an "inadequate" legal remedy. Recall, for example, Barbour's observation that a legal remedy was
traditionally seen as inadequate if it was of only theoretical
value. 7 7 In Chisolm v. Pryor,7 8 the South Carolina Supreme

Court offered a vague definition, reasoning that in order to be
"adequate," the legal remedy must provide for justice in the case
as well as being as practical, efficient, and prompt as the equitable remedy.79 This broad description appears to be the closest
the South Carolina Supreme Court has come to defining specific
inadequacies at law.
Thus, it is not surprising that a review of the cases yields
little in the way of firm guidelines on precisely what constitutes
"inadequacy." The broad language in Chisolm, however, clearly
provides petitioners ample latitude to argue for equitable intervention far beyond any specific settings. The key words are
"practical, efficient, and prompt." It should not be difficult, in
almost any factual situation, to assert that equity offers a remedy that is either more practical, more efficient, or more prompt
than the remedy available at law. Thus, Chisolm gives the petitioner the opportunity to argue for an extremely liberal construction of inadequacy, and to maintain that impediments of
77. Barbour, supra note 18, at 858.
78. 207 S.C. 54, 35 S.E.2d 21 (1945).
79. Id. at 60, 35 S.E.2d at 24 (citing Monteith v. Harby, 190 S.C. 453, 3 S.E.2d 250
(1939)). The court presented a similar general treatment of the term "inadequacy" in
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Custom Recording Co., 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305
(1972):
[W]hether a wrong is irreparable, in the sense that equity may intervene, and
whether there is an adequate remedy at law for a wrong, are questions that are
not decided by narrow and artificial rules. The Courts proceed realistically if
the threatened wrong involves actual damage; the mere uncertainty of fixing
the measure of such damage to the injured party may itself be sufficient to
justify the exercise of equitable jurisdiction; and if the available legal remedy
in a given case reduces itself to a matter of words, rather than to a matter of
efficacy, because of its impracticability, or because the threatened acts may
continue during the progress of an action at law, or because successive actions
at law would be necessary to protect the plaintiff's rights, equity will hold that
the existence of the legal remedy is not an obstacle to the exertion of the equitable power.
Id. at 477-78, 189 S.E.2d at 311-12 (quoting Kirk v. Clark, 191 S.C. 205, 4 S.E.2d 13
(1939)).
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proof, procedure, timing, or compensation at law entitle him to
equitable relief.
III.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LITIGATION

It is hoped that the discussion of the origin and development of the "inadequacy of legal remedy" requirement, its purpose after the merger of law and equity, and its use in South
Carolina, will yield some pragmatic suggestions. What follows is
a resource list of things both petitioners and defendants should
consider in a suit for equitable relief.
The petitioner seeking equitable relief should realize that
South Carolina courts apparently do not apply the "inadequacy
of legal remedy" rule to certain types of inherently equitable actions. The petitioner should, therefore, attempt to structure his
case to fit within one of these categories, or should argue that
the rationale against applying the rule extends to his present action. In this way, the petitioner may cast his suit as one inherently equitable in nature and cognizable in equity without consideration of alternate legal remedies.8 0
A review of the cases, however, reveals that the traditional
rule still applies to most pleas for equitable relief. In particular,
it applies in the three areas of actions for an accounting, for specific performance, and for injunctions. Therefore, if the petitioner desires any of these types of relief, he must be prepared
to show that his remedy at law is inadequate.
The court's treatment of "inadequacy" in these areas, while
not setting forth clear guidelines, does give petitioners latitude
to make imaginative arguments. Following Chisolm, if the petitioner can show that the legal remedy is in any significant way
less efficient, practical, or prompt than equitable relief, the court
may be prepared to question the adequacy of that legal remedy.
The petitioner, relying on the general language of cases like
Chisolm and the traditional exercise of equity to rectify flaws in
the common law, should attempt to focus the court's attention
on this simple question: Will anything in the treatment of this

80. In South Carolina, law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction of a matter arising out of fraud. Military Art Novelty Co. v. Fayonsky, 113 S.C. 470, 473, 101 S.E. 818,
819 (1920); Fass v. Liverpool London & Globe Fire Ins. Co., 105 S.C. 364, 378, 89 S.E.
1040, 1043 (1916).
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case at law impair the working of complete justice? If the answer is "yes," then the petitioner may reasonably claim that he
is entitled to equitable relief because his legal remedy is inadequate. The petitioner should endeavor to promote this broad,
flexible view of "inadequacy" as consistent both with the historic origins and aims of equity, and with the South Carolina
Supreme Court's concern that the legal remedy be as efficient,
practical and prompt as that in equity.
In resisting equitable intervention, the defendant has available two basic approaches. The first is to shift the focus to the
social and moral importance of the interest in dispute, while the
second is to raise a jurisdictional objection.
If the court chooses to interpret the traditional rule as a device for uncovering and rectifying the deficiencies of litigating a
particular case at law, the defendant will usually fail in his attempt to avoid equitable intervention. A reasonably imaginative
petitioner will be able to devise a reason, in any given case, why
equity offers more complete justice than does law. The defendant must, therefore, try to shift the framework of the debate.
He should portray the issue as whether the interest at hand is of
such significance that it merits protection in equity, rather than
whether one form of relief provides justice.
This is the position of Chafee and Rendleman. They view
the traditional rule as a guide to decision, raising the question in
each case of whether the violated right is so fundamental that
the coercive remedies of equity should issue in its protection.
Therefore, even if equity offers some procedural or technical advantage over pursuing the action at law, equity will intervene
under this scheme only if the interest is sufficiently vital to deserve the more potent protection of equity.
This version of the "inadequacy" rule is more beneficial to
the defendant. It allows the court to concede that equity may
offer some advantage to the petitioner, yet still confine him to
his legal remedy if his interest is one that, in the whole spectrum
of rights, is not central and can be adequately protected by legal
remedies. The defendant may question the social importance of
the interest at stake, forcing the petitioner to advocate why society, through the courts, should protect this particular interest
with its most extraordinary sanctions, the coercive remedies of
equity. The defendant should urge upon the court the notion
that the proper role of the rule today is, in fact, to force a de
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facto prioritization of rights, with some warranting equitable

protection and others not calling for such protection. Thus, the
defendant can shift the focus away from the easily-demonstrated
failings of legal remedy to the underlying social and moral worth
of the petitioner's right.
The defendant may also object to equity jurisdiction. Although the dominant theme in South Carolina is that the "inadequacy" rule is not concerned with jurisdiction, some postmerger cases apply the rule in jurisdictional terms. Thus, the
question of whether an adequate legal remedy actually strips the
lower court of equity jurisdiction has not been squarely decided.
It would not, therefore, constitute bad faith for a defendant to
demur to a petition if an alternate remedy was available at law,
and if that remedy appears to the defendant, from the face of
the complaint, to be adequate.
This course would probably be of small utility, however.
Even if the demurrer was sustained, the general practice in
South Carolina is to permit a claimant to "plead over," or to
redraft his pleading so as to remove the defect."' Thus, the petitioner could simply set forth in his amended pleading those specific inadequacies of legal remedy which compel him to resort to
equity.
Also, the weight of modern authority seems to be against
viewing the rule as jurisdictional. While a court might have reservations about whether equitable relief is proper in a given
case, it would not likely question its own power to act. An appeal to the propriety of relief, rather than to the jurisdiction of
the courts, seems more promising. However, a court, unsure as
to whether it ought to grant equitable relief in a given case,
might dismiss the petition using jurisdictional grounds to mask
its own uncertainty. For this reason, a defendant should file a
jurisdictional demurrer, although he should also expect it to be
overruled.
The defendant's best tactic appears to be to frame the question in terms of whether the petitioner's interest merits equitable protection and, simultaneously, to be prepared to counter
the petitioner's specific assertions of inadequacy in case the
court views the traditional rule as a mandate to alleviate all the
81. See S.C. CoD. § 15-13-340 (1976).
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defects of a legal action. This approach, coupled with a jurisdictional demurrer if an adequate legal remedy appears on the face
of the complaint, will assure a potential defendant that he has
an argument to counter whatever view of the rule the petitioner
advances.
Val H. Stieglitz
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